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FINALITY, HABEAS, INNOCENCE, AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY: CAN JUSTICE BE DONE? 
Ellyde Roko* 
Abstract: In 1995, Judge Betty Binns Fletcher posed a question: In the context of the 
death penalty, can justice be done? She did not answer the question at the time. However, an 
examination of the procedural hurdles now facing condemned inmates seeking review of 
claims of constitutional violations suggests the answer is no. Too often courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have favored finality over fairness, elevating strict adherence to procedural 
rules over the responsibility to make sure justice is done. Nowhere is the problem clearer 
than in the arena of actual innocence, where the failure to consider a condemned inmate’s 
claim on the merits could lead to the execution of an innocent person. 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s 2009 response to a petition for an original 
writ of habeas corpus in In re Davis1 shows that courts have gone too far. Rather than merely 
weeding out frivolous claims or showing deference to reasoned state court decisions, federal 
courts have allowed arcane procedural rules to prevent even meritorious claims from being 
heard. The Supreme Court’s rare intervention should encourage courts to interpret procedural 
rules less stringently in an effort to make sure justice is done. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the August 2009 case of In re Davis,2 the Supreme Court of the 
United States took the unusual step of directing a district court in 
Georgia to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the possible innocence of a 
death row inmate.3 After seeking relief from the Georgia Supreme 
Court4 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit5 without 
success, the inmate petitioned the Supreme Court for an original writ of 
habeas corpus.6 The Court had not granted such a writ in nearly fifty 
years.7 Surprisingly, the Court directed the district court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim.8 As Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in 
a concurring opinion, “The substantial risk of putting an innocent man to 
death clearly provides an adequate justification for holding an 
evidentiary hearing.”9 
The procedural rarity of the case, however, quickly fell under the 
shadow of Justice Antonin Scalia’s proclamation in a dissent. “This 
Court,” Justice Scalia wrote, 
has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a 
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later 
able to convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent. 
Quite the contrary, we have repeatedly left that question 
                                                     
2. 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.). 
3. Id. at 1. 
4. Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. 2008). 
5. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009). 
6. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1. The Supreme Court outlined its guidelines for granting an original writ 
of habeas corpus in Felker v. Turpin in 1996, requiring “exceptional circumstances warranting the 
exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers” and a showing that “adequate relief cannot be 
obtained in any other form or from any other court.” 518 U.S. 681, 665 (1996) (citing SUP. CT. R. 
20.4(a)). The procedures included the guidance that “[t]hese writs are rarely granted.” Id. 
7. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today this Court takes the extraordinary step—
one not taken in nearly 50 years—of instructing a district court to adjudicate a state prisoner’s 
petition for an original writ of habeas corpus.”). 
8. Id. at 1 (majority opinion). 
9. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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unresolved, while expressing considerable doubt that any claim  
based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally 
cognizable.10 
The Supreme Court’s dramatic action in Davis highlights the failures 
of the existing system of appellate and habeas review. Davis, unable to 
achieve relief through the usual state and federal channels, had to rely on 
an unlikely action of the Supreme Court to avoid a potentially 
unconstitutional execution. Given the rarity of such relief, the specter of 
executing condemned inmates innocent of death penalty crimes looms. 
Indeed, innocent defendants have been sentenced to death11 and 
evidence suggests some of them have been executed.12 The Davis case 
highlights a question that most often falls on the shoulders of lower 
court judges: In the context of the death penalty, can justice be done? 
Judge Fletcher posed this question in 1995 while giving the Madison 
Lecture at New York University School of Law.13 In her lecture, Judge 
Fletcher highlighted the responsibility of federal district and appellate 
judges in ensuring justice for defendants sentenced to death: “While 
some may view the courts as obstructions when appeals drag on for 
years, the federal courts are surely not doing their duty if they fail to 
protect the constitutional rights of capital defendants and if they tolerate 
execution of innocent people.”14 
Judge Fletcher and her fellow judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit shouldered that responsibility under intense public 
scrutiny in 1992. That year, the pending execution of Robert Alton 
                                                     
10. Id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
11. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 303–05 (2002); 
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 21, 31 (1987) (conducting a study of “cases in which the defendant was erroneously 
convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death”); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful 
Lawlessness: George Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1307, 1330–42 (2004) (describing former Illinois governor George Ryan’s actions in 
pardoning four condemned inmates and commuting the sentences of the 167 remaining on death 
row). 
12. See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 11, at 303–05; David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute 
an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 54–55 (noting that “[t]he fear that an innocent 
person might be executed has long haunted jurors and lawyers and judges” and that “[i]n recent 
years . . . questions have mounted over whether the system is fail-safe”). 
13. See Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 811 (1995) (text of the speech). The James Madison Lecture Series started in 1960 and is 
“designed to enhance the appreciation of civil liberty and strengthen the sense of national purpose.” 
NYU Law James Madison Lectures, http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/fellowships/haysprogram/ 
LitigationandLectures/JamesMadisonLectures/index.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2009). Justice Hugo 
L. Black gave the first Madison Lecture. Id. 
14. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 818. 
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Harris in California placed Judge Fletcher and her colleagues on the 
Ninth Circuit squarely in the middle of the death penalty controversy.15 
As described in newspaper accounts, “[f]or more than six hours, behind-
the-scenes maneuvering by the group of defiant liberal judges delayed 
Harris’s execution as they sought to give every conceivable issue in his 
case a fair hearing.”16 The decision of whether Harris would face 
execution that night pitted “a faction of liberal judges scattered across 
the Western states”17 against the Supreme Court on two different issues. 
First, the Ninth Circuit’s order in the Harris case addressed whether 
Harris received a sufficient hearing on new evidence that his brother had 
shot one of the victims Harris was convicted of murdering.18 Second, 
three inmates facing execution, including Harris, had filed a lawsuit in 
federal court alleging that lethal gas, California’s method of execution, 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.19 A panel of Ninth Circuit 
judges elected to stay Harris’s execution for ten days, “a move 
spearheaded by liberal Circuit Judge Betty Binns Fletcher of Seattle.”20 
Unlike in Davis’s case, the Supreme Court did not grant Harris relief. 
Rather, the Supreme Court made the unusual move of issuing an order in 
the wee hours of the morning that “[n]o further stays of Robert Alton 
Harris’ execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon 
order of this Court.”21 Within thirty-six minutes, Mr. Harris was dead.22 
He was executed before any court could hear his claims. 
                                                     
15. See Richard C. Paddock & Henry Weinstein, Harris Execution Led Nation’s Top Judges to 
Hours of Conflict—Supreme Court Takes a Tough Stand at Top, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 22, 1992, at 
A1. For in-depth analyses of the Harris case, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and 
Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255 (1992); Evan Caminker & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992); 
Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 
(1992). 
16. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A1; see generally Reinhardt, supra note 15. 
17. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A1. 
18. See Reinhardt, supra note 15, at 209–10; see also Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1503–04 
(9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the involvement of both Harris and his brother); Paddock & Weinstein, 
supra note 15, at A1. 
19. See Fierro v. Gomez, 790 F. Supp. 966 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (alleging cruel and unusual 
punishment after a horrifying scene at a Arizona lethal gas execution); see also Reinhardt, supra 
note 15, at 207, 218–19. The Ninth Circuit eventually found execution by lethal gas 
unconstitutional. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996). 
20. Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A3. Numerous judges played a large part in the 
behind-the-scenes maneuvering. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 15 (describing the events 
surrounding the Harris case). 
21. Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992) (mem.); see also Reinhardt, supra note 15, at 
213 (describing the stays issued in the Harris case). 
22. See Paddock & Weinstein, supra note 15, at A3. 
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The move “spearheaded”23 by Judge Fletcher reflects her philosophy 
on the role of federal judges in death penalty cases. As Judge Fletcher 
noted in her Madison Lecture, condemned inmates trying to enforce 
their rights and judges trying to protect those rights face incredible 
hurdles.24 Judges must vigorously guard the rights of the defendants 
accused and convicted of the most brutal crimes while navigating an 
increasingly restrictive procedural framework.25 The procedural 
mechanisms surrounding death penalty appeals and habeas petitions 
have created such obstacles to justice that the Supreme Court in Davis 
reverted to ordering a hearing on an original writ even though the Court 
had not granted such a writ in nearly fifty years. The Davis decision 
demonstrates that the answer to Judge Fletcher’s question, “can justice 
be done?” might in fact be “no.” Absent the unlikely event of Supreme 
Court intervention, no court would have held an evidentiary hearing on 
Davis’s actual innocence claim. In general, judges must take 
extraordinary measures to justify review on the merits, and painstakingly 
examine the claims of the defendants that society has deemed the “worst 
of the worst” to guarantee their convictions and death sentences are fair. 
The Davis case, however, has the potential to turn the focus back to the 
merits of such claims, particularly in the area of actual innocence. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I briefly examines the 
increasingly restrictive scope of habeas review, focusing on the 
procedural hurdles courts and inmates must overcome to reach 
adjudication on the merits. Part II analyzes the case of Thompson v. 
Calderon,26 in which Judge Fletcher and her fellow Ninth Circuit judges 
made remarkable efforts to ensure that procedural barriers did not result 
in the execution of a possibly innocent man. Finally, Part III reviews the 
Supreme Court’s action in Davis and its possible implications, and 
concludes that the law that has developed around habeas corpus review 
has made justice difficult to achieve, but that the Supreme Court’s 
decision could encourage lower federal courts to reach the merits of 
actual innocence claims. 
                                                     
23. Id. 
24. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 818–20. 
25. Id. at 821. 
26. 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 538 (1998). 
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I. PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS INCREASINGLY HAVE 
PREVENTED COURTS FROM REVIEWING HABEAS 
PETITIONS ON THE MERITS 
As Judge Fletcher explained in her 1995 Madison Lecture, in the 
context of the death penalty, “we have prolonged review processes that 
more often than not deflect attention from the real issues of fair trial and 
possible innocence to arcane examinations of technical bars.”27 Judges 
must navigate a confusing rubric of death penalty procedure, a maze that 
increasingly has narrowed defendants’ abilities to challenge potential 
constitutional violations.28 Generally, post-conviction review happens 
through habeas corpus, the availability of which has been restricted over 
the past few decades.29 Numerous scholars and judges have criticized the 
injustice that results from procedural constraints.30 These procedural 
cards, which are stacked against the condemned inmate, have made 
“performing habeas review within these restrictions . . . an awesome 
task.”31 
One need not look far for evidence of these hurdles. In 1996, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) established 
strict guidelines for habeas review.32 AEDPA permits a federal court to 
grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court decision is “contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
                                                     
27. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 826. 
28. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 497 (2d ed. 2003) (placing the success rate for 
habeas petitions at about four percent and attributing that figure to “prisoners’ inability to marshal 
their claims and thread their way through the maze of procedural obstacles that lie in their path on 
the way to an adjudication on the merits”). 
29. See infra notes 32–42 and accompanying text; see also Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger 
Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2355 (2007). 
Many in Congress have apparently concluded that, even when a prisoner can prove that he or 
she is probably innocent, Americans are content to have the federal courts ignore the prisoner’s 
constitutional claims and allow the prisoner to be punished—even executed—if the prisoner’s 
attorneys did not obey all of the applicable procedural rules and if the prisoner’s exculpatory 
evidence is not quite clear and convincing. 
Id. 
30. See, e.g., John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259 
(2006) (examining AEDPA and arguing that the Supreme Court “significantly curtailed the writ of 
habeas corpus” in the years preceding AEDPA); Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme 
Court’s Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485 (1995) (concluding that the Supreme Court's efforts at 
habeas reform had failed); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 443 (2007) (arguing that AEDPA should not be read as disfavoring habeas relief); 
Pettys, supra note 29. 
31. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 821. 
32. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, 2261–2266 (2000)). 
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” 
or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.”33 AEDPA also imposes a one-year statute of 
limitations on habeas petitions34 and further limits prisoners’ ability to 
file more than one such petition.35 
Even before the passage of AEDPA, however, the Supreme Court for 
decades had been restricting habeas corpus relief.36 The Warren Court 
had allowed for the expansion of habeas corpus, making it “the federal 
machinery for bringing new constitutional values to bear in concrete 
cases.”37 But the Rehnquist Court had a different approach, “sometimes 
squarely overrul[ing] Warren Court precedents and sometimes forg[ing] 
its own novel doctrines to circumscribe the writ.”38 Over the years, the 
Rehnquist Court invoked the concept of “finality” with increasing 
frequency to justify procedures prohibiting review.39 As a result, 
“[f]inality, federalism, and to a lesser extent the preservation of judicial 
resources, all have come to top fairness as the mainstay of habeas.”40 By 
                                                     
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
34. Id.; see also Kovarsky, supra note 30, at 453. 
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 
36. See YACKLE, supra note 28, at 495–96; see also In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 831 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“There is no question that, even pre-AEDPA, the procedural obstacles to filing a second or 
successive habeas petition were considerable.” (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317–19 
(1995))); see generally Mark V. Tushnet & Larry W. Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The 
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that many of the key provisions of AEDPA merely codified 
changes the Supreme Court already had made). 
37. YACKLE, supra note 28, at 494 (describing how habeas corpus under the Warren Court 
provided review by “independent Article III courts willing and able to check the coercive power of 
government”). 
38. Id. at 495. See also Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. 
“Process,” 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 313, 314 (1999) (“The Rehnquist Court will be remembered for its 
stark reversal of the Warren-Brennan Court’s expansion of individual rights and protections and for 
elevating procedural rules over substantive values and limiting rights generally, especially those of 
racial minorities.”). These changes also can be attributed to the Court’s adoption of theories 
advanced by two prominent scholars regarding the need for a narrower scope of habeas corpus 
review. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451–52 (1963) (“The procedural arrangements we create for the 
adjudication of criminal guilt have an important bearing on the effectiveness of the substantive 
commands of the criminal law. I suggest that finality may be a crucial element of this effectiveness. 
Surely it is essential to the educational and deterrent functions of the criminal law that we be able to 
say that one violating that law will swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment, just 
punishment.”); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970). 
39. Pettys, supra note 29, at 2335–39. 
40. Friedman, supra note 30, at 491. 
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the time Congress passed AEDPA in 1996, “a Supreme Court impatient 
for congressional action had already done much of the work itself in a 
series of opinions overruling precedent in order to make it harder for 
condemned prisoners to have their constitutional claims heard by a 
federal court.”41 In that same year, the Rehnquist Court determined that 
AEDPA did not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to 
entertain original habeas corpus petitions, but that AEDPA did impose 
new conditions on the Court’s ability to grant relief.42 
As a result, today lower court federal judges spend the majority of 
their time in habeas cases trying to determine whether the court can hear 
the inmate’s claim.43 This onerous task has earned the disdain of 
numerous judges. For example, in Coleman v. Thompson44 in 1991, the 
Supreme Court denied relief on procedural grounds to a death row 
inmate whose lawyers had filed a state appeal one day late.45 This 
holding prompted a dissent by Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by 
Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. The Justices rebuked 
the Court for continuing its “crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in 
the path of any state prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional 
claims” and “creating a Byzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and 
unjustifiable impediments to the vindication of federal rights.”46 Before 
the Davis case reached the Supreme Court, a dissent from an Eleventh 
Circuit judge hearing the case emphasized these procedural obstacles, 
writing that the case “highlights the difficulties in navigating AEDPA’s 
thicket of procedural brambles.”47 And AEDPA’s limitations led Judge 
Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit to describe the legislation as “a 
mockery of the careful boundaries between Congress and the courts that  
our Constitution’s Framers believed so essential to the prevention of  
tyranny.”48  
                                                     
41. BANNER, supra note 11, at 293. 
42. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658 (1996). 
43. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 318–19 (estimating that judges “spend up to ninety 
percent of [their] time in capital cases and other habeas proceedings trying to determine whether a 
defendant’s rights have unwittingly been forfeited and trying to apply the Supreme Court’s arcane 
and almost impenetrable procedural rules”). 
44. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
45. See id. at 757. 
46. Id. at 758–59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
47. In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
48. Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc). In his dissent, Judge Reinhardt wrote he would hold section 104 of 
AEDPA unconstitutional and a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Judge Reinhardt 
reasoned that section 2254(d)(1) intrudes on the judicial power that Article III vests in the courts 
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It is in this environment that judges must seek justice. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT ELEVATED PROCEDURE OVER 
JUSTICE IN THOMPSON V. CALDERON 
On a daily basis, federal court judges must balance proper procedure 
with substantive fairness. The story of Thomas Martin Thompson, a 
California inmate sentenced to death, “illustrates sharply the values, 
interests, and concerns weighed in death penalty habeas cases . . . . On 
the one hand, federal courts consider the state’s interest in finality and 
comity; on the other hand, they consider the interest of the defendant and 
the public in preserving constitutional values.”49 In Thompson’s case, a 
majority of the Ninth Circuit judges sitting en banc vacated his death 
sentence because of constitutional violations at trial.50 Then, the 
Supreme Court reversed—on procedural grounds—and California 
executed Thompson.51 
A. The Ninth Circuit Acted to Prevent a Miscarriage of Justice 
Two days before Thompson’s scheduled execution in August 1997, 
the Ninth Circuit went to extraordinary lengths to vacate his death 
sentence.52 Earlier in the year, the district court had granted Thompson’s 
habeas corpus petition in part, finding that Thompson’s trial counsel had 
been constitutionally deficient.53 But a panel of the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court, holding that counsel’s performance had not 
resulted in prejudice.54 A judge requested that the entire circuit receive 
notification of a refusal to amend the opinion or rehear the case, 
generally viewed as a precursor to a call for en banc review.55 But no 
judge called for an en banc review and the deadline for doing so 
                                                     
“by prohibiting the federal courts from applying the ordinary principles of stare decisis in deciding 
habeas cases involving prisoners held in state custody” and “by requiring federal courts to give 
effect to incorrect state rulings that, in the federal courts’ independent judgment” violate the 
Constitution. Id. at 1261–62. 
49. Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 346. 
50. Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 523 U.S. 538 (1998). 
51. Cal. Dep’t. Corr. and Rehab., Capital Punishment, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/ 
thomasThompson.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
52. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048–51 (describing the process). 
53. Id. at 1047. 
54. Id. The panel’s amended decision is reported in Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358 
(1997). 
55. See Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 328–29. 
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passed.56 The Supreme Court declined to review the case and Thompson 
asked the original panel to reconsider its decision.57 When the panel 
refused to do so and all other proceedings had been exhausted without 
granting Thompson relief,58 a majority of active judges on the Ninth 
Circuit recalled the mandate—the original panel decision from which no 
judge had called for en banc review—“convinced that the panel 
committed fundamental errors of law that would result in manifest 
injustice.”59 The Ninth Circuit vacated the death sentence in its en banc 
decision.60 
1. Substantive Considerations: Thompson’s Claims for Relief 
Thompson challenged the constitutionality of his conviction on two 
grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 
misconduct.61 Thompson alleged that his counsel’s performance at trial 
was deficient because his attorney did not rebut forensic evidence of 
rape and did not adequately impeach two government informants.62 
Thompson also claimed that the prosecutor’s use of inconsistent case 
theories in the separate trials of Thompson and his co-defendant, David 
Leitch, constituted prosecutorial misconduct that violated due process.63 
The court, in an opinion Judge Fletcher authored, examined the 
performance of Thompson’s counsel at trial under the standard the 
Supreme Court articulated in Strickland v. Washington.64 The Ninth 
Circuit pointed to counsel’s failure to rebut forensic evidence 
demonstrating that Thompson committed the rape, which provided the 
grounds for a death sentence.65 The coroner had found a lack of physical 
evidence indicating rape occurred; an expert called during the 
evidentiary hearing testified in part that bruises on the victim were 
several weeks old and that the bodily fluids found on the victim were 
                                                     
56. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1047; see also Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 330–32. 
57. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1047–48; see also Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 334–36. 
58. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048; see also Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 335–36. 
59. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048. 
60. Id. at 1048, 1060. 
61. Id. at 1051–59. 
62. Id. at 1052–55. 
63. Id. at 1055–59. 
64. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland established a two-step process for showing ineffective 
assistance of counsel: First, counsel’s performance was deficient, and second, “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.” Id. at 694. 
65. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1052–53. 
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more consistent with consensual intercourse.66 Thompson’s counsel did 
not pursue this avenue in part because it did not fit with his theory that 
another perpetrator had committed the rape, which conflicted with the 
coroner’s testimony that there was no physical evidence of rape.67 The 
commission of a rape in conjunction with murder provided not only the 
alleged motive for Thompson to commit the murder, but also the special 
circumstances making Thompson eligible for the death penalty.68 
Therefore, counsel’s strategic error prejudiced Thompson by subjecting 
him to the death penalty: “We can think of no error more prejudicial 
than one that is the precipitating cause of an erroneous death sentence.”69 
The court then examined trial counsel’s failure to impeach two 
jailhouse informants.70 The evidentiary hearing had revealed that law 
enforcement officers found Edward Fink, who testified against 
Thompson at trial, to be an unreliable informant.71 Fink had a long 
history of fabricating confessions so he could reap the benefits 
associated with providing the information.72 During trial, Thompson’s 
counsel cross-examined Fink about prior felony convictions, his lengthy 
history of crime, and his abuse of drugs, but “stopped investigating 
Fink’s background before trial because he believed he had enough 
material to cross-examine Fink, and . . . stopped cross-examining him 
because he thought the judge was getting restless and the jury had 
‘gotten the message.’”73 
Thompson’s counsel also failed to impeach a second informant with 
readily available evidence, including the incorrect details of the alleged 
confession, which “parroted almost verbatim inaccurate news reports.”74 
Thompson’s counsel did not introduce evidence that the second 
informant 
had served as an informant since the age of fourteen, that two 
police agencies . . . considered him unreliable, that [his] family 
considered him to be a pathological liar, and that [he] had shared 
                                                     
66. Id. at 1052. 
67. Id. at 1052–53. The panel had found that counsel’s strategic decision in this regard fell below 
the level of reasonableness, but did not result in prejudice. Id. at 1050, 1053. 
68. See id. at 1053. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1053–54. 
71. Id. at 1054. Another lawyer had successfully used information about Fink’s unreliability to 
get the case against his client dropped when Fink was a witness. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 1053–54. 
74. Id. at 1054. 
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a cell with Leitch [Thompson’s co-defendant] for several weeks 
before coming into contact with Thompson.75 
The inadequate impeachment of the informants prejudiced Thompson, 
the en banc court found, in part because the prosecution relied so heavily 
on the informants’ testimony as the dispositive evidence that Thompson 
had committed the rape and murder.76 Effective impeachment would 
have weakened the prosecution’s case substantially.77 Therefore, the 
cumulative effect of counsel’s errors “cast grave doubt on the reliability 
of the rape conviction and the rape special circumstance finding, and 
thus of the death sentence itself.”78 
The court also addressed Thompson’s claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct, finding that a prosecutor cannot present inconsistent 
evidence and theories of the same crime to convict two different 
defendants at separate trials.79 In the preliminary phase of the trial, when 
Thompson and Leitch were being tried jointly, the prosecution presented 
the testimony of jailhouse informants who testified that Thompson had 
told them Leitch wanted the victim dead and that Thompson had had 
consensual sex with the victim before her murder.80 But the prosecution 
did not call these informants at Thompson’s trial, instead relying on two 
new informants who testified that Thompson said he had raped the 
victim.81 At Leitch’s trial, the prosecutor called the original informants, 
who had testified as defense witnesses in Thompson’s trial—and to 
whose testimony the prosecution had objected.82 After securing a guilty 
verdict in Thompson’s trial, the prosecutor “manipulated evidence and 
witnesses, argued inconsistent motives, and at Leitch’s trial essentially 
ridiculed the theory he had used to obtain a conviction and death 
sentence at Thompson’s trial.”83 
While the prosecutorial misconduct claim did not receive a majority 
of votes in the en banc court, Judge Fletcher, joined by three other 
judges, found that the prosecutor’s actions rose to the level of 
prosecutorial misconduct.84 Such conduct prejudiced Thompson because  
                                                     
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1055. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1058. 
80. Id. at 1055. 
81. Id. at 1056. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1057. 
84. Id. at 1058 (“[I]t is well established that when no new significant evidence comes to light a 
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the prosecutor maintained in all proceedings, except Thompson’s trial, 
that only Leitch had a motive for murder.85 
2. Procedural Considerations: AEDPA Requires Recall of the 
Mandate 
Before examining the substance of Thompson’s claims, the en banc 
court first had to demonstrate its ability to review the case. AEDPA 
requirements made the failure to call for en banc review crucial, and 
recall of the mandate necessary, as this habeas petition was Thompson’s 
one bite at the apple.86 Although Thompson made additional motions 
and introduced additional evidence after failing to receive rehearing 
from an en banc court, the majority opinion emphasized that it did not 
consider any of that information in reaching its decision.87 It considered 
only Thompson’s first petition and the evidence contained within it.88 To 
do otherwise would have forced the court to consider Thompson’s claim 
under AEDPA’s even more restrictive framework for reviewing 
successive petitions.89 
The en banc court also emphasized that it did not take lightly the 
recall of a mandate in a death penalty case.90 But the circumstances in 
the Thompson case were extraordinary. Judge Fletcher’s opinion echoed 
the theme from her Madison Lecture a few years earlier that procedural 
restraints should not trump justice: 
Our interest both in protecting the integrity of our processes and 
in preventing injustice are implicated in this case before 
us . . . . [I]n reversing the district court, the panel appears to 
have made fundamental errors of law that, if not corrected, 
would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The consequence of our 
failure to act would be the execution of a person as to whom a 
                                                     
prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories 
and facts regarding the same crime.”). 
85. Id. at 1055, 1059. 
86. Congressional history reveals that many thought of AEDPA as giving habeas petitioners “one 
bite at the apple.” See, e.g., In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 817–18 (11th Cir. 2009). 
87. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1049. 
88. Id. 
89. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 553–54 (1998). 
90. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048 (“Recalling a mandate is an extraordinary remedy and we will 
exercise our authority to do so only in exceptional circumstances, such as when it is necessary in 
order to prevent injustice.”). 
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grave question exists whether he is innocent of the death-
qualifying offense, the alleged rape, and whose conviction on 
the first-degree murder charge may be fundamentally flawed. 
This is a person who has never before been convicted of a crime. 
Under these circumstances, we have an obligation to recall the 
mandate in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial 
process.91 
The Ninth Circuit did all it could to follow proper procedure, 
carefully justifying reaching the merits of the case.92 But the need to 
correct potential constitutional violations resulting in a death sentence 
proved no match for the Supreme Court’s laser-like focus on procedure. 
B. The Supreme Court Reversed the En Banc Court on Procedural 
Grounds Without Considering the Merits 
Thompson’s Ninth Circuit reprieve did not last. With a five-to-four 
majority, the Supreme Court reversed the en banc decision,93 with a 
majority opinion that ironically highlighted many of the very same 
concerns that Judge Fletcher had articulated in her Madison Lecture. 
The Supreme Court examined whether the Ninth Circuit had violated 
AEDPA or abused its discretion in recalling the mandate sua sponte.94 
The Court found no violation of AEDPA because the Ninth Circuit had 
addressed the claims and evidence contained only in Thompson’s first 
habeas petition.95 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit had tried in earnest to follow 
proper procedure.96 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit had abused its discretion.97 
In explaining how the Ninth Circuit’s recall of the mandate 
constituted an abuse of discretion, the majority invoked the doctrine of 
finality.98 The Supreme Court’s opinion highlighted the “profound 
societal costs that attend the exercise of habeas jurisdiction,” which 
warrant strict limitations on its use.99 “These limits reflect our enduring 
respect for the State’s interest in the finality of convictions that have 
                                                     
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 1048–51. 
93. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 541. 
94. Id. at 541–42. 
95. Id. at 554. 
96. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1048–51. 
97. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 542. 
98. Id. at 555–59. 
99. Id. at 554–55 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986)). 
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survived direct review within the state court system.”100 The Supreme 
Court even quoted academic writings from the Warren Court era that 
urged a narrowing of habeas review.101 The Court opined that finality 
not only enhances the quality of work done by federal judges, but also 
preserves the balance between state and federal power.102 As such, when 
a federal court of appeals denies habeas relief, “the State is entitled to 
the assurance of finality.”103 At that point, “finality acquires an added 
moral dimension” and “the State’s interests in actual finality outweigh 
the prisoner’s interest in obtaining yet another opportunity for 
review.”104 
The Court then analyzed the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision.105 
Under habeas corpus jurisprudence, the recall of the mandate would be 
an abuse of discretion unless necessary to avoid a miscarriage of 
justice.106 In the context of innocence, “the miscarriage of justice 
exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence.”107 
In other words, it is not enough that a habeas petitioner show 
constitutional deficiencies at trial; the petitioner must show facts 
demonstrating actual innocence. To meet this standard, the petitioner 
must demonstrate that new evidence renders it more likely than not that 
no reasonable juror would have convicted the petitioner of the 
underlying crime.108 To challenge a death sentence, the petitioner must 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror 
would have found him eligible for the death penalty.109 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion in 
recalling the mandate under either standard.110 
A dissent authored by Justice David Souter, and joined by Justices 
John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsberg, and Stephen Breyer,111 found 
                                                     
100. Id. at 555 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 
(1993)). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (“Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal 
law.”). 
103. Id. at 556. 
104. Id. at 556–57. 
105. Id. at 558. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 559 (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992)). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 559–60. 
110. Id. at 566. 
111. Id. at 566 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the procedural circumstances surrounding the recall of the mandate 
regrettable, but would not have found that the court abused its discretion 
in recalling the mandate: 
[H]owever true it is that the en banc rehearing process cannot 
effectively function to review every three-judge panel that 
arguably goes astray in a particular case, surely it is nonetheless 
reasonable to resort to en banc correction that may be necessary 
to avoid a constitutional error standing between a life sentence 
and an execution.112 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision Led to an Unjust Result 
Judge Reinhardt reflected on the unprecedented sequence of events in 
Thompson v. Calderon in his own Madison Lecture.113 “Reversal by a 
higher court,” he noted, “is not proof that justice is thereby better 
done.”114 The Supreme Court’s decision exemplified the Rehnquist 
Court’s theory of habeas review: Procedural rules limit a court’s ability 
to review the merits of constitutional claims to protect the state’s interest 
in finality.115 But “[i]n Thompson, the Court took one further step—its 
most indefensible thus far—to elevate state procedural interests over 
concern for human life, over due process of law, and yes, over the 
Constitution itself.”116 
Looking at the Supreme Court’s opinion, it is hard to see the balance 
between justice and finality. Whereas the Supreme Court gave “finality” 
a moral dimension, it did not do the same for “justice.” The Supreme 
Court did not consider whether Thompson’s constitutional rights had 
been violated, but rather used the occasion as an opportunity to create a 
new rule further restricting the avenues by which condemned inmates 
can obtain relief for constitutional violations: A federal appeals court 
cannot recall its mandate in a death penalty case unless the defendant 
can establish actual innocence.117 The result of the case, despite the best 
of efforts of the Ninth Circuit judges to ensure justice, was that “the 
worship of abstract procedural principles” resulted in the loss of “our 
concern for fairness and justice.”118 The Supreme Court elevated process 
                                                     
112. Id. at 569. 
113. Reinhardt, supra note 38. 
114. Id. at 314 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
115. Id. at 315–16. 
116. Id. at 351–52. 
117. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 558. 
118. Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 319. 
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above all else, further limiting the ability of judges to ensure a just 
outcome. 
After the Supreme Court vacated the decision, the en banc Ninth 
Circuit considered Thompson’s motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b),119 in effect, a successive habeas petition.120 The court 
thus analyzed Thompson’s claim under the standard set forth in 
AEDPA.121 To bring a successive habeas petition, the petitioner must 
show that 
the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence [and 
that] the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in 
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish 
by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional 
error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense.122 
The court found that Thompson failed to meet the second prong.123 
The additional evidence Thompson offered, viewed in light of the 
evidence as a whole, would not “be sufficient to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 
factfinder would have found Thompson guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of rape, which was the sole aggravating factor supporting the 
death penalty.”124 
 
 
                                                     
119. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b) provides for relief from a final order based upon newly discovered evidence: 
[O]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
120. In habeas cases governed by AEDPA, courts treat Rule 60(b) motions as successive petitions 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Thompson, 151 F.3d at 920–21. 
121. Thompson, 151 F.3d at 921–22. As discussed, the procedural rules governing habeas review 
made the recall of the mandate necessary to prevent the court from considering the petition under 
the more restrictive guidelines for successive habeas petitions. See supra notes 80–83 and 
accompanying text. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that, had the court considered claims or 
evidence presented in Thompson’s later filings, its action would have been based on a successive 
application, and so would be subject to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), one of AEDPA’s limiting provisions. 
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 554. 
122. Thompson, 151 F.3d at 924 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2000)). 
123. Id. at 926. 
124. Id. at 925. 
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Judge Reinhardt dissented.125 Although he agreed with most of the 
majority’s opinion, he would have found Thompson made the requisite 
prima facie showing.126 In analyzing Thompson’s claim, Judge 
Reinhardt referenced the prior en banc decision, in which the court held 
that constitutional violations permeated the trial, noting that the 
substance of that decision still stood because the Supreme Court had 
reversed on procedural grounds.127 In such circumstances, the 
constitutional violations “must color the prism” through which the court 
considered Thompson’s successive petition.128 Despite AEDPA’s 
significant obstacles, Judge Reinhardt emphasized, a prisoner who 
makes a convincing demonstration of actual innocence can, in fact, have 
his claim heard on the merits.129 Judge Reinhardt warned that “the 
miscarriage of justice that is about to occur is the product of the federal 
judiciary’s elevation of procedure over justice, of speed and efficiency 
over fairness and due process.”130 
III. DAVIS COULD ALLOW COURTS TO FOCUS ON THE 
MERITS IN CERTAIN FACTUAL SITUATIONS 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in Davis, the Supreme Court “has never 
held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant 
who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas 
court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”131 But the Supreme Court’s action 
in Davis indicates that the Supreme Court will not tolerate the execution 
of a condemned inmate in the face of convincing evidence tending to 
show actual innocence. After years of procedure trumping justice, the 
Supreme Court may have signaled in Davis that constitutional values 
cannot always come second, at least when it comes to actual innocence. 
                                                     
125. Id. at 931 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. (“This court’s refusal to allow Thompson to file a habeas petition will result in the 
execution of a man who was convicted and sentenced to death in a trial that violated fundamental 
principles of fairness, in which the constitutional violations were so egregious that seven former 
prosecutors, themselves highly experienced in death penalty cases, took the remarkable step of 
filing an amicus brief on his behalf with the United States Supreme Court.”). 
129. Id. at 937 (“Despite increasing restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus, the door has 
nonetheless been left open for someone who can make a convincing demonstration of actual 
innocence under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).”). 
130. Id. 
131. 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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A. The Eleventh Circuit in Davis Applied AEDPA in a Potentially 
Unconstitutional Way 
Before the Davis case arrived at the Supreme Court, the Eleventh 
Circuit had addressed Davis’s actual innocence claim.132 The evidence 
supporting Davis’s claim of innocence included “seven of nine key trial 
witnesses recant[ing] their testimony.”133 The two remaining witnesses 
were the alternative suspect and a witness who, despite telling police he 
could not identify the shooter, later identified Davis.134 Three witnesses 
declared in sworn affidavits that the alternative suspect—the one who 
ran to tell police of the murder in the first place—had confessed to the 
murder.135 
But the majority declined to grant Davis relief on his innocence claim 
because the evidence tending to show Davis’s innocence could not be 
introduced at that point under AEDPA.136 AEDPA allows a successive 
habeas petition only if the evidence could not have been discovered 
earlier;137 Davis had introduced much of the relevant evidence in support 
of his earlier ineffective assistance of counsel claim.138 While Davis 
argued that he could not have brought his actual innocence claim earlier 
because he had not yet exhausted his state remedies on that claim, the 
majority held that Davis should have brought the actual innocence claim 
in his first petition and the court would have stayed the petition while he 
exhausted the claim.139 Therefore, the majority considered only the new 
evidence that could not previously have been discovered—one 
affidavit.140 That affidavit, “standing alone,” could not overcome the 
state’s evidence at trial to make a “clear and convincing” showing of 
actual innocence.141 
The majority’s opinion in the Eleventh Circuit decision in Davis again 
highlights the ways in which restrictions on habeas corpus have eclipsed 
                                                     
132. 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009). 
133. Id. at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 822 (majority opinion). 
137. Id. at 819 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000)). 
138. Id. at 819–20. 
139. Id. at 820. The court then stated Davis had not adequately explained why he failed to bring 
his actual innocence claim in state court at an earlier point. Id. at 821. The court also noted that 
Davis could have brought his actual innocence claim in his first petition and tried to overcome its 
procedural default. Id. 
140. Id. at 822. 
141. Id. at 824. 
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justice. Despite evidence indicating that Davis might be innocent, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that AEDPA prevented it from looking at that 
evidence.142 Furthermore, the majority found that, under AEDPA, Davis 
had to show a separate constitutional violation in addition to showing 
clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence.143 Judge Barkett, in 
dissent, reasoned that AEDPA could not apply “when to do so would 
offend the Constitution and the fundamental concept of justice that an 
innocent man should not be executed.”144 On such occasions, judges 
must assure a just outcome despite procedural obstacles.145 Admitting 
that judges “must deal with the thorny constitutional and statutory 
questions,” the dissent urged that courts not “lose sight of the underlying 
issue.”146 “To execute Davis, in the face of a significant amount of 
proffered evidence that may establish his actual innocence, is 
unconscionable and unconstitutional.”147 
In denying relief, the majority explicitly noted that Davis still could 
petition the Supreme Court for an original writ of habeas corpus.148 In 
doing so, the majority may have signaled the legitimacy of Davis’s 
claim, implicitly acknowledging that Davis’s case had the “exceptional 
circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court’s discretionary 
powers” when “adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or 
from any other court.”149 Considering that the Supreme Court had not 
granted such a writ in fifty years, the chances of Davis achieving relief 
were slim. Nonetheless, the court recommended that Davis use the writ 
and stayed his execution for an extra thirty days so he could do so.150 
The unlikely ground for relief the Eleventh Circuit posited actually 
garnered results.151 Justice Stevens’s concurrence in In re Davis, 
                                                     
142. Id. 
143. Id. (“The statute undeniably requires a petitioner seeking leave to file a second or successive 
petition to establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and another constitutional 
violation.”). 
144. Id. at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“In this case, the circumstances do not fit neatly into the 
narrow procedural confines delimited by AEDPA.”). 
145. Id. at 827–28 (noting that “it is precisely this type of occasion that warrants judicial 
intervention”). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 826 (majority opinion). “The Supreme Court has made clear that the habeas corpus 
statute, even after the AEDPA amendments of 1996, continues to allow it to grant a writ of habeas 
corpus filed pursuant to its original jurisdiction.” Id. at 826–27. 
149. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 665 (1996). 
150. Davis, 565 F.3d at 826–27. 
151. See In re Davis, 558 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.). 
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supporting the decision to order the district court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, echoed Judge Barkett’s dissent, which argued that an “actual 
innocence” claim should receive separate treatment under AEDPA.152 If 
courts interpret AEDPA as barring the claim of a death row inmate who 
can establish his innocence, then the section of AEDPA barring such a 
claim would be unconstitutional.153 “Alternatively, the court may find in 
such a case that the statute’s text is satisfied, because decisions of this 
Court clearly support the proposition that it ‘would be an atrocious 
violation of our Constitution and the principles upon which it is based’ 
to execute an innocent person.”154 
B. Davis Could Shift the Focus from Process Back to Substance 
Over the years, dozens of condemned inmates have been released 
from prison because they were found to be innocent.155 DNA evidence 
exculpated some of them,156 but most had “been victims of dishonest 
witnesses, prosecutors, or police officers, whose lies were found out 
only years later.”157 Yet when courts find that procedural hurdles prevent 
adjudication on the merits, the resulting opinions tend to downplay the 
evidence demonstrating innocence “to persuade the public that justice 
has been done.”158 The Eleventh Circuit panel in Davis and the en banc 
Ninth Circuit addressing Thompson’s successive petition both appeared 
to do just this.159 However, as Judge Fletcher noted: 
We cannot allow ourselves to be lulled by the belief that the 
crimes for which the death penalty is imposed are uniformly 
heinous and that the chance of actual innocence in any given 
case is virtually nonexistent. Unfortunately, that belief is false.  
 
 
                                                     
152. Id. at 1–2 (Stevens, J., concurring); Davis, 565 F.3d at 827–31 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
153. Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (“Even if the court finds that § 2254(d)(1) applies in full, it is arguably 
unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row inmate who has established his 
innocence.”). 
154. Id. at 1–2 (quoting Davis, 565 F.3d at 830). Yet Justice Scalia in his dissent reasoned that 
“[t]here is no sound basis for distinguishing an actual-innocence claim from any other claim that is 
alleged to have produced a wrongful conviction.” Id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
155. BANNER, supra note 11, at 303. 
156. Id. at 303–04. 
157. Id. at 304. 
158. Pettys, supra note 29, at 2360. 
159. “All one need do is read Judge Fletcher’s en banc opinion of last August to discover that 
today’s characterization of the evidence is plainly incorrect.” Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 
933–34 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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The danger of executing innocent people is real, and any clear-
eyed assessment of the death penalty must recognize this.160 
Importantly, the Supreme Court’s action in Davis makes apparent the 
viability of actual innocence claims in death penalty cases. Less apparent 
is what will happen in the wake of Davis. As it stands today, the 
exacting standard for demonstrating the level of actual innocence 
required to obtain even a hearing on the merits renders relief illusive.161 
The Supreme Court’s rare grant of relief in Davis possibly indicates that 
lower courts should have granted Davis an evidentiary hearing on the 
basis of the cumulative evidence before the case reached the Supreme 
Court. 
Going forward, courts could interpret the Davis decision as an 
anomaly with little application outside the precise facts of the case. In 
fact, the decision may discourage courts from granting relief by 
showcasing the original writ of habeas corpus as a feasible option. 
However, lower courts should not view the Supreme Court’s exceptional 
move in such a limited way. Rather, the Supreme Court’s decision to 
direct the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Davis’s actual 
innocence claim should encourage courts to apply a less strict 
interpretation of the requirements for making a showing of actual 
innocence on habeas review. Justice Stevens seemed to be advocating 
this approach: If courts apply AEDPA in such a way that it bars 
consideration of an actual innocence claim, then AEDPA is 
unconstitutional.162 
After the Thompson case, Judge Reinhardt reasoned that it was “time 
to step back and look at what we are doing to ourselves and to our 
system of justice.”163 While such an examination could not effect change 
during the Rehnquist era of the 1990s, Judge Reinhardt saw it as “the 
duty of the academy and the legal profession to make the record that will 
be necessary when the pendulum swings.”164 Cases like those of Thomas 
Thompson and Troy Davis, among numerous others, have made the 
                                                     
160. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 821. 
161. See generally Pettys, supra note 29 (discussing the strict procedural rules that limit the 
consideration of newly discovered evidence, even if that evidence could demonstrate actual 
innocence). 
162. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. See also Pettys, supra note 29, at 2362 
(“The [miscarriage-of-justice] exception could have been crafted in a manner that would ensure 
that, when there were reasonable suspicions that a person had been found guilty of a crime he or she 
did not commit, the federal courts would evaluate the merits of the prisoner’s constitutional claims 
and either grant or deny habeas relief accordingly.”). 
163. Reinhardt, supra note 38, at 352. 
164. Id. 
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record. The Davis decision could—and should—set the pendulum 
swinging back. 
CONCLUSION 
While Judge Fletcher asked the question “can justice be done?” in the 
context of the death penalty, she did not answer it. Instead, she declared, 
“We are a civilized nation. We are a caring people. We value human life. 
We prize human dignity. The decision deliberately to take a human life 
is an awesome responsibility.”165 
“Justice” in the context of the death penalty is difficult to define. 
Justice Brennan stated that, “law, when it merits the synonym justice, is 
based on reason and insight.”166 Some will argue that justice is not done 
so long as states are executing offenders. Others will argue that the long 
time between conviction and execution means justice has not been done. 
A third group, whether or not supporting the death penalty, will charge 
that justice cannot be done unless condemned inmates receive full and 
fair hearings on their claims. Such examination must not be influenced 
by the grotesque nature of these crimes, by a desire for retribution, by 
biased juries or judges, or by procedural restrictions preventing full and 
fair analyses. It is this final definition of justice that the judicial system 
must try to achieve. It is this definition of justice that is evident in the 
death penalty opinions Judge Fletcher has authored over the years. And 
it is this definition of justice that Davis could give courts the latitude to 
achieve. While procedural hurdles erected in the name of “finality” have 
taken priority in the past few decades, the Davis case should serve as a 
turning point to allow judges to reach just results. 
 
                                                     
165. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 828. 
166. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the 
Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 331 (1986). 
